The foreign currency market in a small open economy, like Israel, plays a major role in fiscal and monetary policy decisions, through its effects on the financial markets and the real economy. In this paper we explore the liquidity and efficiency in three related foreign exchange options markets and the information content of the instruments traded in these markets. The unique data set on OTC trading and the central bank auctions, in addition to the exchange traded options provide us with insights about the operation of these markets, their relative efficiency, their information content and their
I. INTRODUCTION
In small open economies international trade plays a major role in the economic life of the country. It is an important part of GDP and contributes to the welfare of the economy.
International transactions, involving goods and services or financial ones require exchange of currencies.
The rate at which one currency is exchanged for another depends not only on economic variables prevailing in both countries but also on the exchange rate policies in those countries including non transparent interventions by the authorities in both countries.
Typically, a large country will not intervene in the currency exchange with a small one (e.g. Israel, Poland, Hong Kong). Thus, in a small open economy the exchange rate will depend on the exchange rate policy in that country in addition to the economic variables that determine the demand and supply of the currency.
In recent years, especially after the '97 Asian currency crisis, many small countries have abandoned the old restrictive policies in favor of less interventionist policies. Many have moved to a fully floating exchange rate though some of them have an unofficial intervention policy for cases when the currency moves outside a given range.
Since 1997 the Bank of Israel has not intervened directly in the currency market. Though it only recently (2005) abolished the official exchange rate band the currency movements were not restricted since the band was so wide 1 that effectively it was ignored. Moreover, the currency markets have been totally liberalized 2 . Thus the exchange rates in recent years have been set in a free market environment. The volume of trading in spot dollar has increased substantially during the last decade and so did the trading in dollar derivatives; forwards and options.
Another recent development in many countries has been the use, by central banks 3 of forward looking information derived from prices of traded instruments like CPI linked bonds, to obtain inflation expectations, or FX option prices, to obtain the distribution of FX rates. The Bank of Israel which has been using inflation expectations, derived from linked and non-linked bonds, for many years has recently added to its menu information derived from prices of FX options.
FX options in Israel are traded in three markets; the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange (hereafter TASE), the banks' Over-The-Counter (hereafter OTC) market and the Bank Of Israel (hereafter BOI) auctions. Though the three markets trade essentially the same instruments the markets have different structures and different regulations which may result in differences in the information provided, in liquidity, in efficiency, etc. This raises the question, which is the relevant one? Should we pay attention to the more liquid market or to the more transparent market? Should we combine the information provided by all three markets? And, how spreads and implied volatilities are determined?
The objective of this study is three fold: First, to explore the efficiency of these related markets. Since the three markets trade the same instruments we can study the effect of different market structures on their efficiency and liquidity. Secondly, to examine the information content, its time series behavior, and its relevance. Third, what role does liquidity play in the price formation in these markets?
The next section of the paper provides a review of the relevant literature. Section III describes the FX market in Israel and the data. Section IV provides the methodology and the hypotheses. In section V we analyze the results, section VI provides an analysis of liquidity in these markets, section VII compares the forecasting ability of the future realized volatility of the three markets, and section VIII provides a summary and conclusions.
II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Though foreign exchange markets, spot and forward, are the largest global markets in the world, the research effort to study these markets has been relatively modest compared to the research on equities markets or the fixed income markets. It is especially so for research on FX options markets. Moreover, research which focuses on the role that options markets play in policy decisions made by central banks is even scantier.
Next we will briefly describe the main findings regarding FX options in general and then discuss the papers which deal with the use of FX options by central banks.
It is first important to mention some general studies, not option based, which have looked at realized volatility in order to learn about the dynamics of the underlying asset, namely use currency options traded in the OTC market to study whether volatility risk is being priced in the options. Using at-the-money straddles they find that volatility risk premium is negative and it decreases with maturity. They find that it is symmetrically higher in the tails (a "smile") and persistent over long maturities and calendar time. The symmetry, the "smile", phenomenon in currency options could be simply explained by the fact that either tail represents the strength of one currency and the weakness of the other one. A "leverage" type argument where a decline in the basic asset triggers an increase in volatility would apply equally to both, the out-of-the-money puts and the out-of-the-money calls.
Liquidity is found to substantially affect prices in many asset classes and markets (see Amihud and Mendelson, 2006 In our study, however, we had access, not only to the exchange traded data but also to the OTC-banks' data. We use data from three different markets where only one of them, the TASE, is completely transparent. The data of the other two, however, is reliable since it is reported by the central bank, the BOI auction data, and the OTC data is reported by each bank to the central bank as required by law. This is the most comprehensive data on ILS/USD transactions available as it is gathered from all markets that trade these options in Israel.
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III. THE FX MARKET AND THE DATA The FX market in Israel
The currency market in Israel was essentially a free market during the sample period but most transactions in the spot market are done through the banking system. The US dollar is the most traded currency (second comes the Euro) by corporations, financial institutions and individuals. Trading in spot and forwards is done OTC, through and by, the banks. Trading in futures and options is done on the TASE and in the OTC market. Intifada', the volumes increased dramatically but later they returned to the pre 2002 levels. Since the inception of trading on the exchange the banks have been offering their 4 The trading in derivatives by the banks is tailor made and may include exotic features. In the case of options the bank will typically be the writer. 5 To the best of our knowledge these FX options did not trade in any other market outside of Israel during the sample period.
customers a variety of FX options, plain vanilla and exotic ones. The third source of FX options is the BOI. Since 1993, the BOI has been offering At-The-Money-Forward (ATMF; X=Se (r-r*)t , see Table 2 for definitions of the terms), put and call options for three and six months, respectively. These are offered in an auction twice a week and do not trade until expiration.
Description of the data
In this study we use data from these three distinct but related markets. 12 . These differences reflect the various characteristics of TASE and OTC markets. In Particular, time to expiration is longer on 9 As all options are European plain vanilla, IV derived from option prices traded on the three markets is calculated in the same way. However, there is one substantial difference due to data limitations; the daily IV of OTC market is derived from all transactions during the trading day while those of TASE and BOI are based on closing prices. 10 As a result the biggest IV is approximately 25% and the smallest is 1%. A different filter which includes only transactions whose implied volatility is within the range of µ±2σ has not changed the results, significantly. 11 Each BOI auction is for a mean notional of approximately 20 million US dollars (puts and calls for 3 and 6 months maturities). 12 the OTC and moneyness 13 is more negative (i.e., more Out-of-The-Money-Forward -OTMF) in that market (see Table 2 ). These differences are reflected in the various implied volatilities (IV): the highest IV is on the TASE which is characterized by many small transactions while the lowest IV is derived from the BOI options where actually only banks are participating in this market and it is characterized by a few large transactions (an auction twice a week). Later we discuss this phenomenon in more detail.
In Table 2 we present basic statistics of these markets regarding volumes, implied volatilities, moneyness, and time to expiration. The BOI options are only calls and puts with a 3 month maturity however, we did not restrict, in Table 2 , the moneyness of the other two markets to just ATMF options, as are the BOI options.
The results of the comparison of the 3 markets exhibit the importance of the so-called 'implied volatility surface' (combinations of time to expiration and moneyness with regard to IV) 14 . The highest average implied volatility, 9.1%, is obtained from options traded on the TASE, the OTC options imply a volatility of 7.9% while the BOI options have an implied of 6.7%. These differences can be explained by various transactions costs due to differences in; transactions size, time to expiration and moneyness. This may explain the lower IV for the BOI options but we have no reason to believe, a priori, that illiquidity can explain the difference between the prices on the TASE and those set in the OTC market unless the markets are inefficient or there is a dominant player e.g., the banks in the OTC market. An important factor explaining the lower IV for ATMF BOI options vis-à-vis the OTC and TASE is the "smile" effect which will make the weighted average IV for the OTC and the TASE higher. The two markets here, the TASE and, to some extent, the OTC exhibit a "smile" which is also been found in most currency markets (see for example, Carr and Wu (2004)). Time to expiration is expected 13 Defined in this paper as
for call options and
for put options where, S is the spot rate, X is the striking price, r and r* are local and foreign interest rate, respectively, and t is time to expiration in annual terms. 14 Goncalves and Guidolin (2005) also find that the surface derived from the S&P500 is important in constructing profitable strategies. Thus, arbitrage opportunities can emerge in the surface edges rather in the center, options that are away from the money rather than at-the-money.
to partially offset the former effect. These overall observations will be later contrasted with observations derived from options with comparable strikes and maturities.
As robustness tests we have used some alternative exchange rates (see Appendix 1) and call options vs. put options (Table 3 ). It appears that the results are not sensitive to either the somewhat different underlying exchange rates that we use or to the type of option, call vs. put.
[Insert Table 3 here]
In both markets, however, we find that the mean of implied volatilities derived from call options is higher than that of put options which is a violation of put-call parity (the options are European).
Another interesting observation is that the ratio of call to put transactions in TASE is larger than the respective figure regarding the OTC. The difference in the call/put ratio could be explained by the dominance of retail customers on the TASE who are using options either to speculate or hedge their risk against depreciation in the ILS/USD exchange rate. Also, the moneyness of the calls is less Out-of-The-Money-Forward (OTMF) than puts while days to maturity of calls are longer.
IV. METHODOLOGY, HYPOTHESES, AND TESTS
The spot FX market
In Table 4 we present some basic statistics of the changes (Log(S t /S t-1 )) in the ILS/USD exchange rate. Although the Jarque-Bera test strictly rejects the hypothesis of a normal distribution, the rejection is due to deviations around the mean rather than "fat tails" and it seems to be symmetric. We next examine the volatility of the exchange rate over the period of the study, 10/2001-12/2004, using three alternative models of the GARCH family.
[Insert Table 4 here]
As observed for other exchange rates, we first used a GARCH (1,1) which treats the errors symmetrically. Yesterday's variance has the strongest effect on the subsequent day which is evidence of persistence. This evidence is consistent with the high autocorrelation exhibited by the time series of IVs. The error term (shock or news at day t-1) does not have a significant effect on the current variance compared to the variance of yesterday which is an indication that the typical error term is small and its effect fades away quickly. The second and the third models are the Threshold GARCH (see Glosten et al., 1993) and Exponential GARCH which split the errors in two, positive and negative, to examine the possibility of asymmetric effects on the variance. It turns out that the inclusion of a positive/negative dummy is justified as the coefficient turns out to be significant. Thus, a positive shock to the ILS/USD exchange rate occurred in day t-1 influences the latter volatility of day t more than a negative shock. It should be noted that a negative economic shock in a small open economy would usually show up in a large devaluation of the currency with respect to the major currencies and that will be associated with a rise in the volatility of the exchange rate. Interestingly, as we show later this apparent asymmetric behavior will not show up in the behavior of the IVs.
The Similarity of the Three FX Option Markets
In the first set of tests we try to answer the following question: is the information content as measured by implied volatility and more directly by the option premium the same in all three markets? If it is different, what are the factors that explain the difference? Alternatively, is there room for arbitrage between the markets? Thus, our null hypothesis is that the three markets are integrated and any difference should be explainable by transactions costs. The null hypothesis regarding any pair of markets e.g., BOI vs. TASE, BOI vs. OTC, and TASE vs. OTC, is tested by two methods:
1. Comparing implied volatilities (IV) computed from similar options.
Comparing option prices using the methodology outlined in Brenner, et al. (2001).
The IV is computed using the Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) model adjusted for FX options (Garman-Kohlhagen, (1983) 
V. HYPOTHESES AND RESULTS
We first present the hypotheses and results by comparing the distributions of IV across the 3 markets. The null hypothesis H 0 : IV(BOI) = IV(TASE); IV(BOI) = IV(OTC); IV(TASE) = IV(OTC), is tested using several parametric and non-parametric tests. In Table 5 we summarize the results in words since the alternative tests give us similar answers as to their significance. In other words, the results are robust vis-à-vis the tests we employ.
[Insert Table 5 here]
We first test the differences in mean, median and variance between the BOI and OTC and between the BOI and TASE. Since the BOI options are always ATMF and issued with 3 month to maturity we try to match, as closely as possible, the OTC and TASE options to the BOI terms. As reported in Table 2 , while those of BOI are the lowest. These differences largely disappear when comparable data is used, as can be observed in Figure 3 . The average IV in the three markets; BOI, OTC, TASE, are indistinguishable from each other (7.2%, 7.5%, and 7.5%, respectively).
These results lead us to look for the source of the differences between the results that use all available data and the results that use only common data. Is the difference all in the tails? Does it all result from OTMF/ITMF options? Are the differences in the tails a result of "fat tails' in the underlying asset or due to transactions costs and/or relative liquidity?
Though we could not reject the hypothesis of the same information content using the mean of IVs as our statistic we were mainly interested in finding out whether the differences in liquidity in these markets is the source of the difference in IVs (prices).
The BOI is at one extreme where, after the auction, the options do not trade until maturity. The TASE options are on the other end, where the same options trade or, could trade, all the time until maturity. The OTC options are in between where similar, not the same, options could be issued any day but usually the position is not offset by trading.
Though these differences in liquidity do exist, it might not show up in price differences, or IV differences, in efficient markets for two reasons: As explained above, and in Brenner et al. (2001), derivative assets should not command a liquidity premium or a discount since they are a zero-sum game. Moreover, in any efficient derivative markets potential arbitrage, in particular across option markets on the same underlying asset, should eliminate price differences between the markets up to transactions costs. In contrast, price differences can prevail if there are liquidity problems i.e., if there is not enough supply/demand to carry out the arbitrage.
In the upper panel of Table 5 we present the results of a test that uses the difference in the prices of options to test for differences between these markets (based on the methodology in Brenner et al. (2001)). The price difference, also termed the liquidity premium, of OTC versus TASE depends on moneyness .While the average price of TASE options using all options is larger than OTC ones by 3.1%, the average price of OTMF TASE options is larger than that of OTC by 8.3 %. In contrast, the mean price of ATMF TASE options is smaller than that of OTC by 4.6% and for ITMF options there is almost no difference. These results are also shown in Figure 4 .
[Insert Figure 4 here]
On the upper left side of the figure i.e., the 1 st quintile of the distribution of both moneyness and 'time to expiration', TASE options are more expensive than OTC options.
In the 3 rd quintile this is reversed, the TASE options are less expensive. Thus the differences in IV (or, in prices) do not coincide with differences in liquidity which supports our argument that in derivative markets illiquidity should not be a pricing factor as it is in the underlying asset markets once the markets are efficient. We thus should be looking for another explanation for the differences we observe in the moneymess domain.
One possible explanation could be that the banks are mainly the writers of OTMF options and the customers will be locked in their position unless they create an identical offsetting position on the TASE or on the OTC which they will carry to maturity which amounts to a non-tradeability discount that is very costly to arbitrage. The opposite may be true for ATMF options where the banks could be mainly on the buying side 15 . To verify this conjecture we would need detailed data on option customers' positions which are currently unavailable. Another angle would be to examine the measurable transactions costs that an arbitrageur would incur assuming that the banks are not the dominant players on either side, long or short. Could transactions costs associated with arbitraging the OTMF OTC options with the ATMF wipe out the differences in prices since it will require dynamic hedging?
Concerning the three markets, the pair wise comparison of comparable daily data, bottom panel of Table 5 , shows that, on average the BOI options have a discount of about 2.9%
vis-à-vis OTC and 2.5% vis-à-vis TASE. Although it is statistically significant, to arbitrage these differences will cost more than 3% whether the other market is the OTC or the TASE. It should be noted that we used the same methodology used in Brenner et Apparently, it has taken the markets 4 years to reduce this discount to the current transaction costs levels.
The other interesting comparison is between the OTC options market and the TASE.
Though the options issued by the banks in the OTC market are essentially bi-lateral, tailor made agreements, and as such do not trade until maturity, we found that the same options, using the above matching methodology, by strike price and maturity, have essentially the same prices; the mean difference is 1.4% which is lower than transactions costs in these markets. Hence, arbitrage activity between these markets is probably not As one can see the main differences between the two surfaces are in the edges.
Particularly, short term OTMF TASE options (quintile 1 in both dimensions) are more expensive compared to the respective OTC options while the opposite holds for ITMF options. The TASE options surface exhibits more of a 'smile type' surface while the OTC surface seems more flat with a slight 'skew'.
VI. LIQUIDITY AND TRANSACTIONS COSTS
Though these markets are strongly related they differ by their structure, liquidity being an important feature, and by their players. In this section we would like to focus on micro-structure issues and how they may be affecting the integration and efficiency of these markets. Since the BOI options are sold twice a week in an auction in limited quantities and have minimal transactions costs associated with them 16 , we will focus our attention on the two main markets, the OTC and TASE.
In Table 6 we provide information on the bid-ask (B-A) spread, usually the main component of transactions costs, in these two markets.
[Insert Table 6 here] First, the mean proportionate B-A spread (the B-A spread divided by the average B-A) across all option series on the TASE is about 17.5% while on the OTC market it is about 9.5%. This difference can be explained by the differences in trading in the two markets.
The main difference between the two markets is in the way that these markets trade. In the OTC, one can get a firm quote from a bank any time during the trading day, while on the TASE the B-A spread is provided by the buy and sell limit orders that continuously arrive at the market. Since there is no market maker who is willing to quote both sides all the time we may have wider spreads in the less liquid options, the OTMF which are far
out. This argument is consistent with Eldor et al. (2006) who find smaller B-A spreads in
the ILS/EUR options traded on the TASE after market makers had started to operate.
Also, it should be noted that the quoted/displayed B-A spreads only measure the cost of a given trading volume and does not tell us about the cost generated by a bigger order, the so called 'price impact'.
When we examine the more liquid options series here, the OTMF we find that in both markets the spreads are lower than in the ATMF and ITMF options. Moreover, the differences between the two markets are much smaller, 2.7% for OTMF options (13.9%
on the TASE vs. 11.2% on the OTC) and 4.9% for ATMF options (18.1% vs. 13.2%).
The variance of the B-A spread across all options is also smaller in the OTC market which again may be explained by the 'market making' position that the banks effectively
assume.
An important factor affecting the B-A spread of a basic asset is the volatility of the asset.
Here, however, we are dealing with the B-A spread in the options market and its relationship to the volatility of the underlying asset. These we believe can be related This hypothesis is in contrast with the current practice to regressing B-A spreads on volatility. We are testing the B-A spreads relationship to IV in TASE and OTC using Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) Regressions.
[Insert Table 7 here]
To minimize the effects of serial correlation that characterizes both series and avoiding different levels of integrations, we have applied the 3SLS to the first differences of daily IV and B-A spreads 17 . The upper panels of Table 7 (panels (a) and (b)) depict the results 17 The differences are all I(0). In the lower panel of Table 7 , IV and B-A spreads are regressed simultaneously on the above exogenous variables using 3SLS. In almost all cases the results are the same either in the direction of the impact or the level of robustness. Our main conjecture concerning the interrelations between IV and B-A spreads in the FX market, to the best of our knowledge, has not been reported before.
We also examined the differences between the OTC and TASE markets regarding their [Insert Table 8 here]
It can be seen that in most cases the figures for the TASE are smaller. I.e., it is more liquid and more efficient than the OTC market. This is reasonable as the TASE market is To summarize these findings, although the B-A spread, a measure of liquidity, is smaller on the OTC than on the TASE, the latter seems to provide greater depth than the OTC, especially in the options which are ATMF or slightly OTMF. This difference probably reflects the differences in the micro structure of these markets. Thus, while the prices, as reflected in their IVs, are the same as a result of arbitragers operating in both markets, the B-A spreads of TASE are larger than those of the OTC due to the fact that the TASE is a pure electronic market with no designated market makers while in the OTC the banks effectively act as 'market makers'. However, when it comes to options that trade frequently in bigger quantities the electronic market making becomes less important. The effective market making activity can also explain the differences in the volatility surfaces in these markets. The apparent relative deviations from put-call parity in the OTC market may not reflect arbitrage opportunities since it is not transparent and continuous as is the TASE.
VII. FORECASTING ABILITY OF ILS/USD FUTURE VOLATILITY
Information content of options can be examined in several ways. One such examination is to look at the forecasting ability of option prices vis-à-vis the future volatility of FX spot. Figure 6 presents the IV derived from BOI options, future realized volatility, and a VIX (using the volatility index methodology) measure applied to the ILS/USD exchange rate.
[Insert Figure 6 here]
In order to avoid overlapping in the forecasts, we derive the various IVs for the next quarter using 3 months options traded at the first week of each quarter. The Figure shows that the various IVs are higher almost in all the sample period than the future realized volatility within the next quarter. However, the correlations among all IVs and between them and the future realized volatility are relatively high (see the lower panel of Figure   6 ). Since we have three options markets operating concurrently we would like to know whether they have the same ability to forecast the future realized volatility. We compute implied volatility from all options as well as ATMF options only, in all three markets.
The realized future volatility (RV) for the next quarter is computed using daily returns of ILS/USD in each quarter except the first week. The IV of all three markets is highly correlated with RV, about 0.8 while the correlation coefficient among the IV of the three markets is higher -around 0.97. We test the forecasting ability of the three markets by using two tests: Mean Errors (ME) and Root Mean Square Errors (RMSE). The former reflects the direction of the error biasness while the latter reflects the accuracy of forecasting. In general, all forecasts overestimated the true volatility as in Christiensen and Prabhala (1998) and Szakmary et al. (2003) . However, forecasts derived from ATMF options outperformed forecasts based on all options. In addition, among the three markets, BOI and OTC ATMF were the best forecasters although all three markets were close in their forecasting ability. These results support further the evidence that the three markets function rather efficiently, are closely related and arbitrage activity may not be a profitable activity.
The interrelations between the three markets are prominently shown around the days of expiration at the TASE.
[Insert Table 9 here]
The table presents volumes and number of transactions of the three markets across the days of the month. While the differences between these days are random the days around the expiration at TASE are characterized by very high volumes and number of transactions in all markets. For example, the volume in an average day in OTC and BOI are 41% and 27%, respectively that of the expiration day. In contrast, a day before TASE's expiration the figures go up to 61% and 94%, respectively and a day after expiration these figures jump to 92% and 86%, respectively. These phenomena reflect both the 'roll over' of the expiring options to the new ones and the interrelationships among the three markets where large volume in TASE is related to large volumes in the other markets. I I 1 9 9 9 I V 1 9 9 8 I I 1 9 9 8 I V 1 9 9 7 I I 1 9 9 7 I V 1 9 9 6 I I 1 9 9 6 I V 1 9 9 5 I I 1 9 9 5 I V 1 9 9 4 I I 1 9 9 4 1) days when all 3 markets were activ and options with max +/-.5% deviation from ATMF and between 50 -130 days to expiration, are included.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This
2) Based on the standard deviation of the daily changes in a week denominated in annual terms.
Implied volatility (IV)
IV_BOI IV_OTC IV_TASE Historical_SD (monthly window in annual terms) Table 3 . The surface reflects a 'flat' shape with a tendency of 'smirk'. For Moneyness and Days to Expiration quintiles, see the lower panel of Table 3 . . The surface reflects 'smile' shape. For Moneyness and Days to Expiration quintiles, see the lower panel of Table 3 .
Figure 6
Correlation Coefficients Matrix (1) The data in this table is not filtered neither in moneyness nor in days to expiration.
(2) In OTC market each transaction is equal to one contract, in TASE each transaction contain on average 60 contracts while in BOI auctions each daily transaction reflects the amount sold to the investors (there were 315 days during the sample period).
(3) Moneyness is defined for Call options as:
and for Put options as:
Where, S is the spot rate, X is the excersize price, r* and r are the LIBOR and Makam rates, respectively, and dt is time to expiration in annual terms. (4) all options are issued At The Money (ATMF) i.e., Moneyness = 0. (1) The data in this table is not filtered neither in moneyness nor in days to expiration.
Where, S is the spot rate, X is the excersize price, r* and r are the LIBOR and Makam rates, respectively, and dt is time to expiration in annual terms.
Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE)
A comparison between OTC and TASE: Basic statistics by the type of option (6) OTMF is defined as transaction whose moneyness is less than -0.5%, ATMF is defined as transaction whose moneyness is moneyness is betweenen -0.5% and 0.5%, and ITMF as transaction whose moneyness is larger than 0.5%. Days with less than 4 transactions were excluded from the sample. (1) OTMF is defined as transaction whose moneyness is less than -0.5%, ATMF is defined as transaction whose moneyness is between -0.5% and 0.5%, and ITMF as transaction whose moneyness is larger than 0.5%. Contracts with less than 4 transactions were excluded from the sample. (1) The table shows how the volumes and prices are influenced by TASE's expiration day. The higher volumes around TASE's expiration day are explained by the roll-over phenomenon. It also points on the relations between the markets. (2) Usually it is Tuesday of the 3rd week of the month. The mean of expiration day is considerd as 100.
TASE OTC BOI
Number of transactions and volume of all options in OTC, TASE, and BOI around TASE's expiration day
